Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays

[40] See references later. [41] Philosophical Essays, "The Nature of Truth." I have been persuaded by Mr. Wittgenstein that this theory is somewhat unduly simple, but the modification which I believe it to require does not affect the above argument [1917]. [42] Cf. Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, passim. I formerly supposed, contrary to Meinong's view, that the relationship of supposing might be merely that of presentation. In this view I now think I was mistaken, and Meinong is right. But my present view depends upon the theory that both in judgment and in assumption there is no single Objective, but the several constituents of the judgment or assumption are in a many-term relation to the mind. [43] This view has been recently advocated by Miss E.E.C. Jones. "A New Law of Thought and its Implications," Mind, January, 1911. [44] I should now exclude "I" from proper names in the strict sense, and retain only "this" [1917]. [45] Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910, p. 141. [46] Mind, July, 1910, p. 380. [47] Mind, July, 1910, p. 379. [48] The theory which I am advocating is set forth fully, with the logical grounds in its favour, in Principia Mathematica, Vol. I. Introduction, Chap. III; also, less fully, in Mind, October, 1905. [49] I use this phrase merely to denote the something psychological which enters into judgment, without intending to prejudge the question as to what this something is. [233]