Project Gutenberg #8438
The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle
Aristotle
340 BCEAristotle's ethical treatise, prepared introduction plus Books I-X from Project Gutenberg plaintext.
Project Gutenberg #8438 Public domain in the United States Cover source Local typographic cover created for MojiMori from public-domain source metadata
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AI Summary
Chapter 3 — Book II Central question How do human beings acquire moral virtue? Main argument Book II argues that moral virtue is not innate but formed through habit. Virtue is a disposition to choose the mean...
Clear of this smoke and surge thy barque direct;”
because of the two extremes the one is always more, and the other less,
erroneous; and, therefore, since to hit exactly on the mean is
difficult, one must take the least of the evils as the safest plan;[21]
and this a man will be doing, if he follows this method.
We ought also to take into consideration our own natural bias; which
varies in each man’s case, and will be ascertained from the pleasure
and pain arising in us. Furthermore, we should force ourselves off in
the contrary direction, because we shall find ourselves in the mean
after we have removed ourselves far from the wrong side, exactly as men
do in straightening bent timber.[22]
But in all cases we must guard most carefully against what is pleasant,
and pleasure itself, because we are not impartial judges of it.
We ought to feel in fact towards pleasure as did the old counsellors
towards Helen, and in all cases pronounce a similar sentence; for so by
sending it away from us, we shall err the less.[23]
Well, to speak very briefly, these are the precautions by adopting
which we shall be best able to attain the mean.
Still, perhaps, after all it is a matter of difficulty, and specially
in the particular instances: it is not easy, for instance, to determine
exactly in what manner, with what persons, for what causes, and for
what length of time, one ought to feel anger: for we ourselves
sometimes praise those who are defective in this feeling, and we call
them meek; at another, we term the hot-tempered manly and spirited.
Then, again, he who makes a small deflection from what is right, be it
on the side of too much or too little, is not blamed, only he who makes
a considerable one; for he cannot escape observation. But to what point
or degree a man must err in order to incur blame, it is not easy to
determine exactly in words: nor in fact any of those points which are
matter of perception by the Moral Sense: such questions are matters of
detail, and the decision of them rests with the Moral Sense.[24]
At all events thus much is plain, that the mean state is in all things
praiseworthy, and that practically we must deflect sometimes towards
excess sometimes towards defect, because this will be the easiest
method of hitting on the mean, that is, on what is right.