Project Gutenberg #6762
Politics: A Treatise on Government
Aristotle
350 BCEAristotle's treatise on constitutions and civic life, prepared introduction plus book-and-chapter sections from Project Gutenberg plaintext.
Project Gutenberg #6762 Public domain in the United States Cover source Local typographic cover created for MojiMori from public-domain source metadata
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AI Summary
Chapter 71 — Book V, Chapter XI Central question What preserves a kingdom? Main argument Aristotle explains that kingdoms endure by means contrary to the causes of their destruction. The chapter is a practical...
abstain from all
kinds of insolence; more particularly from corporal punishment; which
you must be most cautious never to exercise over those who have a
delicate sense of honour; for, as those who love money are touched to
the quick when anything affects their property, so are men of honour and
principle when they receive any disgrace: therefore, either never employ
personal punishment, or, if you do, let it be only in the manner in
which a father would correct his son, and not with contempt; and, upon
the whole, make amends for any seeming disgrace by bestowing greater
honours. But of all persons who are most likely to entertain designs
against the person of a tyrant, those are chiefly to be feared and
guarded against who regard as nothing the loss of their own lives, so
that they can but accomplish their purpose: be very careful therefore
of those who either think themselves affronted, or those who are dear
to them; for those who are excited by anger to revenge regard as nothing
their own persons: for, as Heraclitus says, it is dangerous to fight
with an angry man who will purchase with his life the thing he aims at.
As all cities are composed of two sorts of persons, the rich and the
poor, it is necessary that both these should find equal protection from
him who governs them, and that the one party should not have it in their
power to injure the other; but that the tyrant should attach to himself
that party which is the most powerful; which, if he does, he will have
no occasion either to make his slaves free, or to deprive citizens of
their arms; for the strength of either of the parties added to his
own forces will render him superior to any conspiracy. It would be
superfluous to go through all particulars; for the rule of conduct which
the tyrant ought to pursue is evident enough, and that is, to affect to
appear not the tyrant, but the king; the guardian of those he governs,
not their plunderer, [1315b] but their protector, and to affect
the middle rank in life, not one superior to all others: he should,
therefore, associate his nobles with him and soothe his people; for his
government will not only be necessarily more honourable and worthy of
imitation, as it will be over men of worth, and not abject wretches who
perpetually both hate and fear him; but it will be also more durable.
Let him also frame his life so that his manners may be consentaneous
to virtue, or at least let half of them be so, that he may not be
altogether wicked, but only so in part.