Project Gutenberg #6762
Politics: A Treatise on Government
Aristotle
350 BCEAristotle's treatise on constitutions and civic life, prepared introduction plus book-and-chapter sections from Project Gutenberg plaintext.
Project Gutenberg #6762 Public domain in the United States Cover source Local typographic cover created for MojiMori from public-domain source metadata
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AI Summary
Chapter 55 — Book IV, Chapter XI Central question What form of government and way of life is best for communities in general? Main argument Aristotle shifts from classification to practical recommendation. He...
We proceed now to inquire what form of government and what manner
of life is best for communities in general, not adapting it to that
superior virtue which is above the reach of the vulgar, or that
education which every advantage of nature and fortune only can furnish,
nor to those imaginary plans which may be formed at pleasure; but to
that mode of life which the greater part of mankind can attain to,
and that government which most cities may establish: for as to those
aristocracies which we have now mentioned, they are either too perfect
for a state to support, or one so nearly alike to that state we now
going to inquire into, that we shall treat of them both as one.
The opinions which we form upon these subjects must depend upon one
common principle: for if what I have said in my treatise on Morals is
true, a happy life must arise from an uninterrupted course of virtue;
and if virtue consists in a certain medium, the middle life must
certainly be the happiest; which medium is attainable [1295b] by
every one. The boundaries of virtue and vice in the state must also
necessarily be the same as in a private person; for the form of
government is the life of the city. In every city the people are divided
into three sorts; the very rich, the very poor, and those who are
between them. If this is universally admitted, that the mean is best, it
is evident that even in point of fortune mediocrity is to be preferred;
for that state is most submissive to reason; for those who are very
handsome, or very strong, or very noble, or very rich; or, on the
contrary; those who are very poor, or very weak, or very mean, with
difficulty obey it; for the one are capricious and greatly flagitious,
the other rascally and mean, the crimes of each arising from their
different excesses: nor will they go through the different offices
of the state; which is detrimental to it: besides, those who excel in
strength, in riches, or friends, or the like, neither know how nor are
willing to submit to command: and this begins at home when they are
boys; for there they are brought up too delicately to be accustomed to
obey their preceptors: as for the very poor, their general and excessive
want of what the rich enjoy reduces them to a state too mean: so that
the one know not how to command, but to be commanded as slaves, the
others know not how to submit to any command, nor to command themselves
but with despotic power.
A city composed of such men must therefore consist of slaves and
masters, not freemen; where one party must hate, and the other
despise, where there could be no possibility of friendship or political
community: for community supposes affection; for we do not even on the
road associate with our enemies. It is also the genius of a city to be
composed as much as possible of equals; which will be most so when the
inhabitants are in the middle state: from whence it follows, that that
city must be best framed which is composed of those whom we say are
naturally its proper members. It is men of this station also who will be
best assured of safety and protection; for they will neither covet what
belongs to others, as the poor do; nor will others covet what is theirs,
as the poor do what belongs to the rich; and thus, without plotting
against any one, or having any one plot against them, they will live
free from danger: for which reason Phocylides wisely wishes for the
middle state, as being most productive of happiness. It is plain, then,
that the most perfect political community must be amongst those who are
in the middle rank, and those states are best instituted wherein these
are a larger and more respectable part, if possible, than both the
other; or, if that cannot be, at least than either of them separate;
so that being thrown into the balance it may prevent either scale from
preponderating.
It is therefore the greatest happiness which the citizens can enjoy to
possess a moderate and convenient fortune; for when some possess too
much, and others nothing at [1296a] all, the government must either be
in the hands of the meanest rabble or else a pure oligarchy; or, from
the excesses of both, a tyranny; for this arises from a headstrong
democracy or an oligarchy, but very seldom when the members of the
community are nearly on an equality with each other. We will assign a
reason for this when we come to treat of the alterations which different
states are likely to undergo. The middle state is therefore best, as
being least liable to those seditions and insurrections which disturb
the community; and for the same reason extensive governments are least
liable to these inconveniences; for there those in a middle state are
very numerous, whereas in small ones it is easy to pass to the two
extremes, so as hardly to have any in a medium remaining, but the
one half rich, the other poor: and from the same principle it is that
democracies are more firmly established and of longer continuance than
oligarchies; but even in those when there is a want of a proper number
of men of middling fortune, the poor extend their power too far, abuses
arise, and the government is soon at an end.
We ought to consider as a proof of what I now advance, that the best
lawgivers themselves were those in the middle rank of life, amongst whom
was Solon, as is evident from his poems, and Lycurgus, for he was not
a king, and Charondas, and indeed most others. What has been said will
show us why of so many free states some have changed to democracies,
others to oligarchies: for whenever the number of those in the middle
state has been too small, those who were the more numerous, whether the
rich or the poor, always overpowered them and assumed to themselves the
administration of public affairs; from hence arose either a democracy
or an oligarchy. Moreover, when in consequence of their disputes and
quarrels with each other, either the rich get the better of the poor, or
the poor of the rich, neither of them will establish a free state;
but, as the record of their victory, one which inclines to their own
principles, and form either a democracy or an oligarchy.
Those who made conquests in Greece, having all of them an eye to the
respective forms of government in their own cities, established either
democracies or oligarchies, not considering what was serviceable to the
state, but what was similar to their own; for which reason a government
has never been established where the supreme power has been placed
amongst those of the middling rank, or very seldom; and, amongst a few,
one man only of those who have yet been conquerors has been persuaded
to give the preference to this order of [1296b] men: it is indeed an
established custom with the inhabitants of most cities not to desire an
equality, but either to aspire to govern, or when they are conquered, to
submit.
Thus we have shown what the best state is, and why. It will not be
difficult to perceive of the many states which there are, for we have
seen that there are various forms both of democracies and oligarchies,
to which we should give the first place, to which the second, and in
the same manner the next also; and to observe what are the particular
excellences and defects of each, after we have first described the best
possible; for that must be the best which is nearest to this, that worst
which is most distant from the medium, without any one has a particular
plan of his own which he judges by. I mean by this, that it may happen,
that although one form of government may be better than another, yet
there is no reason to prevent another from being preferable thereunto in
particular circumstances and for particular purposes.