Project Gutenberg #6762
Politics: A Treatise on Government
Aristotle
350 BCEAristotle's treatise on constitutions and civic life, prepared introduction plus book-and-chapter sections from Project Gutenberg plaintext.
Project Gutenberg #6762 Public domain in the United States Cover source Local typographic cover created for MojiMori from public-domain source metadata
84
words at B2 or above
A1
A2
B1
B2
C1
C2
C2+
highlighted
at or above your level
AI Summary
Chapter 72 — Book V, Chapter XII Central question Which governments are shortest lived? Main argument Aristotle concludes that oligarchy and tyranny are the most fragile regimes because they rest on narrow and...
Indeed an oligarchy and a tyranny are of all governments of the shortest
duration. The tyranny of Orthagoras and his family at Sicyon, it is
true, continued longer than any other: the reason for which was, that
they used their power with moderation, and were in many particulars
obedient to the laws; and, as Clisthenes was an able general, he never
fell into contempt, and by the care he took that in many particulars his
government should be popular. He is reported also to have presented a
person with a crown who adjudged the victory to another; and some say
that it is the statue of that judge which is placed in the forum.
They say also, that Pisistratus submitted to be summoned into the court
of the Areopagites. The second that we shall mention is the tyranny of
the Cypselidse, at Corinth, which continued seventy-seven years and
six months; for Cypselus was tyrant there thirty years, Periander
forty-four, and Psammetichus, the son of Georgias, three years; the
reason for which was, that Cypselus was a popular man, and governed
without guards. Periander indeed ruled like a tyrant, but then he was an
able general. The third was that of the Pisistradidae at Athens; but it
was not continual: for Pisistratus himself was twice expelled; so that
out of thirty-three years he was only fifteen in power, and his son
eighteen; so that the whole time was thirty-three years. Of the rest
we shall mention that of Hiero, and Gelo at Syracuse; and this did not
continue long, for both their reigns were only eighteen years; for
Gelo died in the eighth year of his tyranny, and Hiero in his tenth.
Thrasybulus fell in his eleventh month, and many other tyrannies have
continued a very short time. We have now gone through the general cases
of corruption and [1316a] means of preservation both in free states and
monarchies. In Plato's Republic, Socrates is introduced treating upon
the changes which different governments are liable to: but his discourse
is faulty; for he does not particularly mention what changes the best
and first governments are liable to; for he only assigns the general
cause, of nothing being immutable, but that in time everything will
alter [***tr.: text is unintelligible here***] he conceives that nature
will then produce bad men, who will not submit to education, and in
this, probably, he is not wrong; for it is certain that there are some
persons whom it is impossible by any education to make good men; but
why should this change be more peculiar to what he calls the best-formed
government, than to all other forms, and indeed to all other things
that exist? and in respect to his assigned time, as the cause of the
alteration of all things, we find that those which did not begin
to exist at the same time cease to be at the same time; so that, if
anything came into beginning the day before the solstice, it must alter
at the same time. Besides, why should such a form of government be
changed into the Lacedaemonian? for, in general, when governments alter,
they alter into the contrary species to what they before were, and
not into one like their former. And this reasoning holds true of other
changes; for he says, that from the Lacedaemonian form it changes into
an oligarchy, and from thence into a democracy, and from a democracy
into a tyranny: and sometimes a contrary change takes place, as from a
democracy into an oligarchy, rather than into a monarchy. With respect
to a tyranny he neither says whether there will be any change in it; or
if not, to what cause it will be owing; or if there is, into what other
state it will alter: but the reason of this is, that a tyranny is an
indeterminate government; and, according to him, every state ought to
alter into the first, and most perfect, thus the continuity and circle
would be preserved. But one tyranny often changed into another; as
at Syria, from Myron's to Clisthenes'; or into an oligarchy, as was
Antileo's at Chalcas; or into a democracy, as was Gelo's at Syracuse; or
into an aristocracy, as was Charilaus's at Lacedaemon, and at Carthage.
An oligarchy is also changed into a tyranny; such was the rise of most
of the ancient tyrannies in Sicily; at Leontini, into the tyranny of
Panaetius; at Gela, into that of Cleander; at Rhegium into that of
Anaxilaus; and the like in many other cities. It is absurd also to
suppose, that a state is changed into an oligarchy because those who are
in power are avaricious and greedy of money, and not because those who
are by far richer than their fellow citizens think it unfair that those
who have nothing should have an equal share in the rule of the state
with themselves, who possess so much-for in many oligarchies it is not
allowable to be employed in money-getting, and there are many laws to
prevent it. But in Carthage, which is a democracy, money-getting is
creditable, and yet their form of government remains unaltered. It is
also absurd to say, that in an oligarchy there are two cities, one of
the poor and another of the rich; for why should this happen to them
more than to the Lacedaemonians, or any other state where all possess
not equal property, or where all are not equally good? for though no
one member of the community should be poorer than he was before, yet
a democracy might nevertheless change into an oligarchy; if the rich
should be more powerful than the poor, and the one too negligent, and
the other attentive: and though these changes are owing to many causes,
yet he mentions but one only, that the citizens become poor by luxury,
and paying interest-money; as if at first they were all rich, or the
greater part of them: but this is not so, but when some of those who
have the principal management of public affairs lose their fortunes,
they will endeavour to bring about a revolution; but when others do,
nothing of consequence will follow, nor when such states do alter is
there any more reason for their altering into a democracy than any
other. Besides, though some of the members of the community may not have
spent their fortunes, yet if they share not in the honours of the state,
or if they are ill-used and insulted, they will endeavour to raise
seditions, and bring about a revolution, that they may be allowed to do
as they like; which, Plato says, arises from too much liberty. Although
there are many oligarchies and democracies, yet Socrates, when he is
treating of the changes they may undergo, speaks of them as if there was
but one of each sort.
BOOK VI