The Analysis of Matter

proper procedure is to look for logical structures composed of the original terms, and such that these structures always have the mathematical properties in question. It will be found that, where the assumption of such properties has proved fruitful, this procedure is usually possible. Starting from events, there are many ways of reaching points. One is the method adopted by Dr Whitehead, in which we consider "enclosure-series." Speaking roughly, we may say that this method defines a point as all the volumes[Pg 292] which contain the point. (The niceties of the method are required to prevent this definition from being circular; also to distinguish a set of volumes having only a point in common from such as have a line or surface in common.) As a piece of logic, this method is faultless. But as a method which aims at starting with the actual constituents of the world it seems to me to have certain defects. Dr Whitehead assumes that every event encloses and is enclosed by other events. There is, therefore, for him, no lower limit or minimum, and no upper limit or maximum, to the size of events. Each of these assumptions demands consideration. Let us begin with the absence of a lower limit or minimum. Here we are confronted with a question of fact, which might conceivably be decided against Dr Whitehead, but could not conceivably be decided in his favour. The events which we can perceive all have a certain duration, i.e. they are simultaneous with events which are not simultaneous with each other. Not only are they all, in this sense, finite, but they are all above an assignable limit. I do not know what is the shortest perceptible event, but this is the sort of question which a psychological laboratory could answer. We have not, therefore, direct empirical evidence that there is no minimum to events. Nor can we have indirect empirical evidence, since a process which proceeds by very small finite differences is sensibly indistinguishable from a continuous process, as the cinema shows. Per contra, there might be empirical evidence, as in the quantum theory, that events could not have less than a certain minimum spatio-temporal extent. Dr Whitehead's assumption, therefore, seems rash. At the same time, there is a confusion to be avoided: space-time may be continuous even if there is a lower limit to events. Suppose every elementary event filled a four-dimensional cube, e.g. a cubic centimetre lasting for the time that light takes to travel a centimetre; and suppose, conversely, that every such four-dimensional[Pg 293] cube was occupied by an event. The space-time of such a world would be continuous, given suitable axioms, although events had a minimum. And, conversely, the absence of a minimum to events does not insure spatio-temporal continuity. The two questions are thus wholly distinct. I conclude that there is at present no means of knowing whether events have a minimum or not; that there never can be conclusive evidence against their having a minimum; but that conceivably evidence may hereafter be found in favour of a minimum. It remains to consider the question of a maximum. On the question of a maximum to events, the arguments are rather logical than empirical. In a certain sense, any series of events may be called one event; the Battle of Waterloo, for instance, may count as a single occurrence. But in a complex event of this sort, there are parts which have spatio-temporal and causal relations to each other; no single entity devoid of physical structure persists throughout the whole period. I mean by this that anything simultaneous with everything that happened during the Battle of Waterloo is a complex of parts not all simultaneous with each other. Whether we are to call such a complex an "event" or not is merely a question of words. But if our object is to exhibit the structure of the physical world, it is clear that we must distinguish objects having physical structure from such as are only component parts of such structures. It is therefore convenient to have a word for the latter. The word I shall use is "event." But I shall not go so far as to say that an "event" must have no structure. I shall assume only that any structure which it may have is irrelevant both to physics and to psychology; in other words, that its parts, if any, do not have scientifically distinguishable relations to other objects. When the word "event" is used in this sense, it is plain that,[Pg 294] so far as our experience goes, no event lasts for more than a few seconds at most. There is no a priori reason why this should be the case; it is merely an empirical fact. But I think a phraseology which obscures it can only lead to confusion. For the above reasons, I am unable to accept Dr Whitehead's construction of points by means of enclosure-series as an adequate solution of the problem which it is designed to solve. This problem is: to discover structures having certain geometrical properties, and composed of the raw material of the physical world. There is another method, which may be called that of "partial overlapping." In my Knowledge of the External World, I applied this method to the definition of instants. It is easy to see that it is adequate for this purpose in psychology, where we have a one-dimensional time-order which remains definite in spite of relativity. But in physics it is the "point-instant" that has to be defined, i.e. a completely definite position in space-time, not merely in space or merely in time. Here the method is only applicable with suitable modifications. However, the method must first be explained as applied to the one-dimensional psychological time-series. We assume that two events may have a relation which I will call "compresence," which means, practically, that they overlap in space-time. Take, for instance, notes played by different instruments in orchestral music: if one is heard beginning before the other has ceased to be heard, the auditory percepts of the hearer have "compresence." If a group of events in one biography are all compresent with each other, there will be some place in space-time which is occupied by all of them. This place will be a "point" if there is no event outside the group which is compresent with all of them. We may therefore define a "point-instant," or simply a "point," in one biography, as a group of events having the following two properties: [Pg 295] (1) Any two members of the group are compresent; (2) No event outside the group is compresent with every member of the group. When we pass beyond one dimension, this method is no longer applicable. Take, for example, the three circles in the accompanying figure: each overlaps with the other two, but there is no region common to all three. If we try to remedy this (as I believe we can) by starting, in two dimensions, with a relation of three events, which is to hold when all three have a region in common, we are still met by difficulties. The three circles , , have a region in common, and the shaded area has a region in common with and , also with and , and also with and , yet , , and have no region in common. Therefore if events may have queer shapes such as , our new three-term relation will still not enable us to define a "point." [Pg 296] Since the problem with which we are concerned belongs to analysis situs, in which we are occupied only with such properties of figures as are unaffected by continuous deformation, we cannot simply declare in advance that no events are to have odd shapes. But before attempting to deal with this difficulty, it will be as well to consider certain points in analysis situs, which will show us what are the requisites of a solution of our problem. In analysis situs we start with two conceptions, that of a point, and that of "neighbourhoods of a given point"—the latter being collections of points. Certain definitions obtained in this way will be useful. The following definitions are due to Leopold Vietoris.[60] If is a set of points, a point is called a "Häufungspunkt" of if in every neighbourhood of there is a point other than . Two collections of points "touch" each other in a point if belongs to one collection and is a "Häufungspunkt" of the other. A set of points is "continuous from to " if it contains and , and any two parts of it whose sum is , of which one contains and the other , touch each other (in at least one point). A set of points is a "Linienstück" from to if it, but none of its proper parts, is continuous from to . Hausdorff[61] has defined a "metrical" space and a "topological" space in the following terms. A "metrical" space is a manifold such that with any two points , is associated a real not-negative number having the following three properties: (a) ; (b) is only zero when and are identical; (c) is greater than or equal to .[62] A "topological" space is a manifold whose elements are associated with sub-classes of the manifold such that: (A) To every corresponds at least one , and every contains ; (B) If , are both neighbourhoods of there is a neighbourhood of , say which is contained in the common part of and ; (C) If y is a member of , there is a neighbourhood of which is contained in ; (D) Given any two distinct points, there is a neighbourhood of the one and there is a neighbourhood of the other such that the two have no common point.[63] [Pg 297] In order to be able to apply the usual methods of limits to a topological space, Hausdorff has need of an "Abzählbarkeitsaxiom," or "denumerative axiom." He gives two such axioms (p. 263), of which the first is the weaker, and is for some purposes insufficient. The first states that the number of neighbourhoods of a given point is never greater than ; the second states that the total number of neighbourhoods of all points is together . This second axiom suffices for all the usual kinds of argument, without the introduction of any metrical ideas. P. Urysohn[64] has shown that every topological space which satisfies Hausdorff's second denumerative axiom and has one further property (which he calls "normality"[65]) is metricizable. These are the main points from analysis situs that are relevant to the solution of our problem. For the present, we are not concerned with metrical properties, but only with such as belong to "topological" spaces. In virtue of Urysohn's theorem, it will be possible to introduce a metric if we can construct the right sort of topological space. But when one metric is possible, an infinite number are possible. The metric which is actually introduced in theory of relativity is introduced for empirical reasons; it uses a quantitative relation which might be called degree of causal proximity. The existence of this relation is not implied by anything with which we are at present concerned. Moreover, the metrical manifold which we require in physics is not a "metrical space" according to Hausdorff's definition given above, since interval in relativity does not possess the properties (b) and (c)[Pg 298] which distance possesses in Hausdorff's definition. However, so far as topological considerations are concerned, we may, without appreciable inaccuracy, assign to small regions the topological properties which belong to a small region of Euclidean space lasting for a short time, i.e. to a continuous series of small regions of Euclidean space all geometrically indistinguishable. In analysis situs, both points and neighbourhoods are given. We, on the other hand, wish to define our points in terms of "events" where "events" will have a one-one correspondence with certain neighbourhoods. We want our "events" to correspond with neighbourhoods which are above a certain minimum and below a certain maximum when, at a later stage, the empirical metric is introduced. We have to