The Analysis of Matter

group has a centre in the space of percipients; this centre is real if occupied by a percipient, while otherwise it is ideal. (Our space is not assumed to be a smooth geometrical space, and the centre may be a finite volume.) As a rule, even when the[Pg 212] centre is occupied by a percipient, it nevertheless contains no member of the group, not even an ideal member: "the eye sees not itself." A group, that is to say, is hollow: when we get sufficiently near to its centre it ceases to have members. This is a purely empirical observation. A full group which contains any real members will be called a "real" group; a group whose members are all ideal will be called "ideal." It remains to show how we are to define an ideal group. In addition to the laws correlating percepts forming one group—which may be called, in an extended sense, laws of I perspective—there are also laws as to the manner in which percepts succeed one another. These are causal laws in the ordinary sense; they are included in the usual laws of physics. When we know a certain number of members of a full group, we can infer the others by the laws of perspective; it is found that some exist and some do not, but all that do exist are members of the calculated full group. In like manner, when we are given a sufficient number of full groups, we can calculate other full groups at other times. It is found that some of the calculated full groups are real, some ideal, but that all real groups are included among those calculated. (I am assuming an impossible perfection of physics.) Two groups belonging to different times may, in virtue of causal relations which we shall explain when we come to discuss substance, be connected in the way which makes us regard them as successive states of one "thing" or "body." (The time of a full group, by the way, is not exactly the time at which its members occur, but slightly earlier than the earliest real member—or much earlier, in the case of a star. The time of a full group is the time at which physics places the occurrence supposed to be perceived.) The whole series of groups belonging to a given "thing" is called a "biography." The causal laws are such as to allow us sometimes to infer "things." A thing is "real"[Pg 213] when its biography contains at least one group which is "real," i.e. contains at least one percept; otherwise a thing is "ideal." This construction is closely analogous to that of "ideal" points, lines, and planes in descriptive geometry. We have to ask ourselves whether there are any reasons for or against it. The above construction preserves the whole of physics, at least formally; and it gives an interpretation, in terms of percepts and their laws, to every proposition of physics which there is any empirical reason to believe. "Ideal" percepts, groups, and things, in this theory, are really a shorthand for stating the laws of actual percepts, and all empirical evidence has to do with actual percepts. The above account, therefore, preserves the truth of physics with the bare minimum of hypothesis. Of course there should be also rules for determining when a calculated percept is real and when it is ideal; but this is difficult, since such rules would have to contain a science of human actions. It may be known that you will see certain things if you look through a telescope, but it is difficult to know whether you will look through it. This completion of our science is therefore not possible at present; but that is no argument against the truth of our science so far as it goes. It is obvious that the method might be extended so as to make all perceptions except one's own "ideal"; we should then have a completely solipsistic interpretation of physics. I shall, however, ignore this extension, and consider only that form of the theory in which all percepts are admitted. The metaphysic which we have been developing is essentially Berkeley's: whatever is, is perceived. But our reasons are somewhat different from his. We do not suggest that there is any impossibility about unperceived existents, but only that no strong ground exists for believing in them. Berkeley believed that the grounds against them were conclusive; we only suggest that the grounds in their favour are[Pg 214] inconclusive. I am not asserting this: I am proposing it as a view to be considered. The great difficulty in the above theory of "ideal" elements is that it is hard to see how anything merely imaginary can be essential to the statement of a causal law. We have to explain the dictaphone which repeats the conversation. We will suppose that it was seen in place before and after the conversation, but not during it. Consequently, on the view we are examining, it did not exist at all during the conversation. Causal laws, stated without fictitious elements, will thus involve action at a distance in time and space. Moreover, our percepts are not sufficient to determine the course of nature: we derive causal laws from close observation, and preserve them in other cases by inventing "ideal" things. This would not be necessary if percepts sufficed for the causal determination of future percepts. Thus the view we are examining is incompatible with physical determinism, in fact though not in form. We could multiply difficulties of this kind indefinitely. No one of them is conclusive, but in the aggregate they suffice to account for the fact that it is almost impossible to compel oneself to believe such a theory. Perhaps continuity (not in a strict mathematical sense) is one of the strongest objections. We experience sensible continuity when we move our own body, and when we fixedly observe some object which does not explode. But if we repeatedly open and shut our eyes we experience visual discontinuity, which we find it impossible to attribute to the physical objects which we alternately see and do not see, the more so as, to another spectator, they remain unchanged all the time. Causation at a distance in time, though not logically impossible, is also repugnant to our notions of the physical world. Therefore, although it is logically possible to interpret the physical world in terms of ideal elements, I conclude that this interpretation is implausible, and that it has no positive grounds in its favour. [Pg 215] Nevertheless the above construction remains valid and important, as a method of separating perceptual and non-perceptual elements of physics, and of showing how much can be achieved by the former alone. As such, I shall continue to utilize it in the sequel. The only thing rejected is the view that "ideal" elements are unreal.[48] The matter would, of course, be otherwise in this last respect if we could accept the argument for idealism, whether of the Berkeleyan or the German variety. These arguments profess to prove that what exists must have a mental character, and therefore compel us to interpret physics accordingly. I reject such a priori argumentation, whatever conclusion it may be designed to prove. There is no difficulty in interpreting physics idealistically, but there is also, I should say, no necessity for such an interpretation. "Matter," I shall contend, is known only as regards certain very abstract characteristics, which might quite well belong to a manifold of mental events, but might also belong to a different manifold. In fact, the only manifolds known for certain to possess the mathematical properties of the physical world are built up out of numbers, and belong to pure mathematics. Our reason for not regarding "matter" as actually being an arithmetical structure derived from the finite integers is the connection of "matter" with perception; that is why our present discussion is necessary. But this connection, as I shall try to show, tells us extremely little about the character of the unperceived events in the physical world. Unlike idealists and materialists, I do not believe that there is any other source of knowledge from which this meagre result can be supplemented. Like other people, I allow myself to speculate; but that is an exercise of imagination, not a process of demonstrative reasoning. I shall assume henceforth not only that there are percepts[Pg 216] which I do not perceive, connected with other people's bodies, but also that there are events causally connected with percepts, as to which we do not know whether they are perceived or not. I shall assume, e.g. that if I am alone in a room and I shut my eyes, the objects in it which I no longer see (i.e. the causes of my visual percepts) continue to exist, and do not suddenly become resurrected when I re-open my eyes. This must be taken in conjunction with what was said earlier about perspective in a generalized sense, and about the common space in which we locate the physical objects which, for common sense, are perceived by several people at once. We collect correlated percepts into a group, and we suppose that there are other members of the group, corresponding to places where there is no percipient—or, to speak more guardedly, where there is not known to be a percipient. But we no longer assume, as when we were constructing "ideal" elements, that what at such places is what we should perceive if we went to them. We think, e.g., that light consists of waves of a certain kind, but becomes transformed, on contact with the eye, into a different physical process. Therefore what occurs before the light reaches an eye is presumably different from what occurs afterwards, and therefore different from a visual percept. But it is supposed to be causally continuous with the visual percept; and it is largely for the sake of this causal continuity that a certain re-interpretation of the physical world seems desirable. In some ways, the language of causation is perhaps not the best for expressing what is intended. What is intended may be expressed as follows. Confining ourselves, to begin with, to the percepts of various observers, we can form groups of percepts connected approximately, though not exactly, by laws which may be called laws of "perspective." By means of these laws, together with the changes in our other percepts which are connected with the perception of bodily movement,[Pg 217] we can form the conception of a space in which percipients are situated, and we find that in this space all the percepts belonging to one group (i.e. of the same physical object, from the standpoint of common sense) can be ordered about a centre, which we take to be the place where the physical object in question is. (For us, this is a definition of the place of a physical object.) The centre is not to be conceived as a point, but as a volume, which may be as small as an electron or as large as a star. The essential assumption for what is commonly called the causal theory is, that the group of percepts can be enlarged by the addition of other events, ranged in the same space about the same centre, and connected both with each other and with the group of percepts by laws which include the laws of perspective. The essential points are (1) the arrangement about a centre, (2) the continuity between percepts and correlated events in other parts of the space derived from percepts and locomotion. The first is a matter of observation; the second is a hypothesis designed to secure simplicity and continuity in the laws of correlation suggested by the grouping of percepts. It cannot be demonstrated, but its merits are of the same kind as those of any other scientific theory, and I shall therefore henceforth assume it. FOOTNOTES: [43] On this subject, cf. chap. IV. of Dr