The Analysis of Matter

preserve its identity throughout the[Pg 98] transfer, and the only answer suggested by the accompanying formulæ is that the identity is that of an algebraic expression in terms of the co-ordinates. This, however, is clearly insufficient. Professor Eddington, after expounding Weyl's theory, proceeds to generalize it, and some of his accompanying elucidations are relevant to our present difficulties. Thus he says (p. 217): "In Weyl's theory, a gauge-system is partly physical and partly conventional; lengths in different directions but at the same point are supposed to be compared by experimental (optical) methods; but lengths at different points are not supposed to be comparable by physical methods (transfer of clocks and rods), and the unit of length at each point is laid down by a convention. I think this hybrid definition of length is undesirable, and that length should be treated as a purely conventional or else a purely physical conception." He proceeds to a generalized theory in which, at first, length is purely conventional, for comparisons at a point as well as for comparisons between different points. This generalized theory does not seem to involve the same kind of difficulties as those which have been troubling us. The following passage, for example, states the matter with great clearness (p. 226): "The relation of displacement, between point-events and the relation of 'equivalence' between displacements form part of one idea, which are only separated for convenience of mathematical manipulation. That the relation of displacement between and amounts to such-and-such a quantity conveys no absolute meaning; but that the relation of displacement between and is 'equivalent' to the relation of displacement between and is (or at any rate may be) an absolute assertion. Thus four points is the minimum number for which an assertion of absolute structural relation can be made. The ultimate elements of structure are thus four-point elements. By adopting the condition of affine geometry, I have limited the possible assertion with regard to a four-point[Pg 99] element to the statement that the four points do, or do not, form a parallelogram. The defence of affine geometry thus rests on the not implausible view that four-point elements are recognized to be differentiated from one another by a single character—viz. that they are or are not of a particular kind which is conventionally named parallelogramical. Then the analysis of the parallelogram property into a double equivalence of to and to , is merely a definition of what is meant by the equivalence of displacements." Here we have a logically satisfactory theoretical basis for a metric. We may suppose that, as a matter of fact, there are important properties of groups of four points which are "parallelogramical," and that actual physical measurement is an approximate method of discovering which groups have this property. We shall find certain laws approximately fulfilled by rough-and-ready measurements, and fulfilled with increasing accuracy as we introduce refinements into the process of measurement. Consider, for example, Euclid's first axiom: Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Presumably Euclid regarded this as a logically necessary proposition, and so do people who are engaged in the practice of measurement. If two lengths each equal to a metre are found to be not equal to each other, the plain man assumes that there must be a mistake somewhere. We are therefore continually redefining the actual operations of measurement with a view to verifying Euclid's first axiom as nearly as possible. But with the above-quoted definition of equality of length the first axiom becomes a substantial proposition, namely: If is a parallelogram, and likewise , then is a parallelogram. If this proposition is true, then it is theoretically possible to define measurement in such a way that two lengths each equal to a metre shall always be equal to each other. What is called "accuracy" is, speaking generally, an attempt to obtain a result conformable with some ideal standard supposed to be logical but in fact physical.[Pg 100] What do we mean by saying that a length has been "wrongly" measured? Whatever result we obtain from measuring a given length, the result represents a fact in the world. But in what we call a "wrong" measurement, the fact ascertained is complex and of small universality. If the observer has simply misread a scale, the fact ascertained involves reference to his psychology. If he has neglected a physical correction—e.g. for the temperature of his measure—the fact refers only to a measurement carried out with that particular apparatus on that particular occasion. In relativity theory we have another set of what might be called "inaccurate" measurements—e.g. measurements of the masses of -particles or -particles emitted from radio-active bodies must be corrected for their motion relative to the observer before they acquire any general significance. It is always the search for simple relations which enter into general laws that governs successive refinements. But the existence of such relations (where they do exist) is an empirical fact, so that much that seems prima facie to be logically necessary is really contingent. On the other hand, the number of premisses in a deductive system which has to agree with an empirical science can, by logical skill, be diminished to an extent which may be astonishing. Of this, the theory of relativity is a very remarkable example. The theory is a combination of two diverse elements: on the one hand, new experimental data; on the other, a new logical method. It must be regarded as a happy accident that the two appeared together; if the right kind of theoretical genius had not happened to be forthcoming, we might have had to be content for a long time with patched-up hypotheses such as the FitzGerald contraction. As it is, the combination of experiment and theory has produced one of the supreme triumphs of human genius. [Pg 101] CHAPTER XI THE PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIAL LAWS THROUGHOUT the theory of relativity, there is an application, with increasing stringency, of a principle which begins to make itself felt in physics with Galileo, in spite of the fact that he did not possess the mathematical technique which it demands. The principle I mean is that of "differential laws," as it may be called. This means that any connection which may exist between distant events is the result of integration from a law giving a rate of change at every point of some route from the one to the other. One may give a simple illustration of a differential law from the "curve of pursuit": a man is walking along a straight road, and his dog is in a field beside the road; the man whistles to the dog, and the dog runs towards him. We suppose that at each moment the dog runs exactly towards where his master is at that moment. To discover the curve described by the dog is a problem in integration, which becomes definite given certain further data. The Newtonian law of gravitation gives a very similar type of law, except that it is the acceleration of the planet, not its velocity, that is directed towards the sun at each moment. It has long been a commonplace of physics that its causal laws should have this differential character: they should tell primarily a tendency at each moment, not the outcome after a finite time. In a word, its causal laws take the form of differential equations, usually of the second order. This view of causal laws is absent from quantum theory, from the ideas of savages and uneducated persons, and from the works of philosophers, including Bergson and J. S. Mill. In quantum theory, we have a discrete series of possible[Pg 102] sudden changes, and a certain statistical knowledge of the proportion of cases in which each possibility is realized; but we have no knowledge as to what determines the occurrence of a particular change in a particular case. Moreover, the change is not of the sort that can be expressed by differential equations: it is a change from a state expressed by one integer or set of integers to a state expressed by another. This kind of change may turn out to be physically ultimate, and to mark out at least a part of physics as governed by laws of a new sort. But we are not likely to find science returning to the crude form of causality believed in by Fijians and philosophers, of which the type is "lightning causes thunder." It can never be a law that, given at one time, there is sure to be at another time, because something might intervene to prevent n . We do not derive such laws from quantum phenomena, because we do not, in their case, know that will not continue throughout the time in question. The natural view to take at present is that quantum phenomena have to do with the interchange of energy between matter and the surrounding medium, while continuous change is found in all processes which involve no such interchange. There are, however, difficulties in any view at present, and it is not for a layman to venture an opinion. It seems not improbable that, as Heisenberg suggests, our views of space-time may have to be modified profoundly before harmony is achieved between quantum phenomena and the laws of transmission of light in vacuo. For the moment, however, I wish to confine myself to the standpoint of relativity theory. Although physics has worked with differential equations ever since the invention of the calculus, geometry was supposed to be able to start with laws applying to finite spaces. If we accept the Einsteinian point of view, there can no longer be any separation between geometry and physics; every proposition of geometry will be to some extent causal. Take first[Pg 103] the special theory. Relatively to axes () we can obtain propositions of geometry by keeping constant; but relatively to other axes these propositions will refer to events at different times. It is true that these events, in any system of co-ordinates, will have a space-like interval, and will have no direct causal relations with each other; but they will have indirect causal relations derived from a common ancestry. Let us take some example, say: The sum of the angles of a triangle is two right angles. Our triangle may be composed of rods or of light-rays. In either case, it must preserve a certain constancy while we measure it. Both rods and light-rays are complicated physical structures, and the physical laws of their behaviour are involved in taking them as approximations to ideal straight lines. Nevertheless, so far as the special theory is concerned, all this might be allowed, and yet we might maintain a certain distinction between geometry and physics, the former being a set of laws supposed exact, and approximately verified, for the relations of the , , co-ordinates in any Galilean frame when is kept constant. But in the general theory the intermixture of geometry and physics is more intimate. We cannot accurately reduce to the form: and therefore we cannot accurately distinguish one co-ordinate as representing the time. We cannot therefore obtain a timeless geometry by putting =constant. With this goes a change in our axioms. We no longer have, as in Euclid, in Lobatchevsky and Bolyai, and in projective geometry, axioms dealing with straight lines of finite length. We have now only, as our initial apparatus, a geometry of the infinitesimal, from which large-scale results must be obtained by integration. From this point of view, Weyl's extension of Einstein appears natural. As we saw in the last chapter, quoting Eddington, the statement that the distances ,[Pg 104] are equal is the assertion of a relation between the four points. , , , . If all the relations which constitute our initial apparatus are to be confined to the infinitesimal, so must this relation; if so, , , , must all be close together, and Weyl's geometry results. At this point, however, the pure mathematician is likely to feel a difficulty which does not greatly trouble the physicist.